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Ruling on Rituals: Courts of Law and
Religious Practices in Contemporary
Hinduism
Gilles Tarabout
1 Scholars have regularly pointed out that in secular states the involvement of courts in
religious matters is commonplace. There are two main reasons for this. One is that in the
modern state, “religion is, in part, constituted by means of law, but simultaneously as
something that is constituted to stand at arm’s length from the law” (Lambek 2013:1).1
The second follows on from the first: as Jurinski (2004:3) remarks in the case of the USA,
“the  courts  have  become arbiters  of  what  kinds  of  restrictions  the  government  can
impose on religious practice, and what role religion will play in public life.” In fact, the
courts  seldom  restrict  themselves  to  being  keepers  of  religious  boundaries.  As  Sen
(2007:6)  observes,  comparing  India  and  the  United  States,  “the  line  between
interpretation of law and legislation often gets blurred in Supreme Court rulings. … This
has meant that the Court … actively intervenes and shapes public discourse.”2 Indeed, as
early as the 1970s, Marc Galanter clearly pointed out two possible ways in which the law
may exercise its control over religion, which he called “the mode of limitation” and “the
mode of intervention”:
By limitation I refer to the shaping of religion by promulgating public standards
and by  defining  the  field  in  which these  secular  public  standards  shall  prevail,
overruling conflicting assertions of religious authority. By intervention I refer to
something beyond this—to an attempt to grasp the levers of religious authority and
to reformulate the religious tradition from within, as it were (Galanter 1971:480).
This paper sets out to contribute to the study of how Indian courts of law have a hand in
shaping  religion  and  more  particularly  Hinduism.  While  entirely  in  agreement  with
Galanter, my specific purpose is to suggest that various forms of “limitation” ensuing
from the very fundamentals of Common law (applying to India) directly lead, on their
own, to far-reaching “interventions” in religious traditions.
2 There is considerable scholarship on relationships between law and religion in India,
which has followed various lines of  enquiry.  Authors have pointed out the legacy of
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British policies in taking over the management of religious institutions in the name of
administrative rationalization; the history and political consequences of Private Laws; the
Constitutional protection and regulation of the freedom of religion (Articles 25 and 26);
the role of  the Courts in implementing this Constitutional mandate;  or the reformist
agenda that some judges may try to promote. In the first part of this paper I sum up the
aspects of these studies that mainly pertain to politics of secularism concerning Hindu
temples. Then, in a second section, I turn to the comparatively less explored issue of the
impact on religious practices of the mere imposition of legal categories and requirements.
How does the legal process by itself and beyond any particular policies, beyond even a
secularist  agenda,  shape  religious  practices  (Hindu,  Muslim,  Christian)?  While
acknowledging that such legal “determinism” is completely entangled in general policies
or judges’ personal values, I nevertheless wish to point out a few systemic properties of
modern law that have a decisive effect in shaping religion—although my argument also
applies to Islam and Christianity, my study focuses on Hinduism.3
3 This  paper relies  on judgments  of  the upper courts  of  India with a  special  focus on
religious institutions, not personal law.4 These judgments constitute an extremely rich
corpus of texts in which it is possible to distinguish various levels and means of legal
action concerning religion-related issues.
 
The politics of secularism: an overview
Secularization as individualization
4 Although India presents features of its own, many issues are common to secular states
throughout the world where legal conceptions of religion are anchored in the distinction
the law makes between “private” and “public” domains. This was already the case in
India  during  British  rule  and  was  subsequently  reinforced  in  the Constitution  after
Independence. The “Fathers of the Constitution,” according to a former Chief Justice of
India,  “placed  the  individual  at  the  centre  of  the  Constitutional  scheme”  (Bhagwati
2005:40),5 though not without a debate (Dhavan 1987:209). As far as religion is concerned,
the Preamble to the Constitution ensures all citizens the liberty of “thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship”; and Article 25 (1) stipulates that:
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practise and propagate religion—my emphasis) (Constitution of India 1950:
Art.25(1))
This individual  character of  religious freedom has been further developed in various
upper court  decisions.  For instance,  in 1995,  the Supreme Court  of  India referred to
Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England (1 st ed.  1907,  regularly  reedited  and  updated  since  then)
according to which “A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals” and
extended this conception to all  religious bodies (Most.  Rev.  P.M.A.  Metropolitan 1995:§35).
Society,  and religion,  is  thus seen as  being made up of  an addition of  individuals,  a
presupposition that is widely at odds with the holistic view projected by most religious
systems: placing the individual at the center of legal action may foster, by itself, profound
changes in religious attitudes and practices.  As Maya Warrier (2003:214) pointed out,
secularization in general may be linked to a “retreat of religion from public life”:
By secularization I mean therefore a decline in the public,  community-affirming
and  socially-binding  aspect  of  religion,  and  a  growing  trend  towards  the
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internalization of faith such that it is personal choice, inner spiritual striving and
self-fulfillment that become central to religious life rather than the affirmation of
shared community orientations, affiliations, aspirations and identities.
Such  an  individualistic  perspective  found  its  way,  for  instance,  into  a  definition  of
religion given by the High Court of Bombay, which ruled that “whatever binds a man to
his own conscience and whatever moral or ethical principle regulate[s] the lives of men
believing in that theistic conscience or religious belief that alone can constitute religion
as  understood  in  the  Constitution” (Ratilal  Panachand  Gandhi 1952:§4) .  However,  this
definition, solely in terms of conscience, was felt to be ill-adapted to Indian realities and
was later broadened by the Supreme Court in the so-called “Shirur Mutt case”:
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept,
it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which
are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might
extend  even  to  matters  of  food  and  dress  (The  Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious
Endowments 1954:1024).
Thus, religious freedom actually extends beyond the individual’s conscience and concerns
public  space through the freedom accorded to religious practice,  as  stated clearly in
Article  25  (1)  of  the  Constitution,  quoted  above,  however  limited  it  may  be  by
considerations of “public order, morality, and health” (a provision common to secular
Constitutions throughout the world).6 Religious communities are also recognized as such
in Article 26 of the Constitution under the label “religious denomination.” While the law
therefore acknowledges absolute religious freedom in the intimacy of individuals, it also
recognizes the fact that the expression of this religious freedom may take various public
forms, whether through religious practice or by taking part in religious collectivities and
institutions. Nevertheless, this remains an individualistic perspective according to which
society — and religion—are made up of an addition of persons, with their rights and
actions limited by the public good, a presupposition that is widely at variance from what
social science has reported about the entanglement, if not the indeterminacy, of religious
issues with social, economic, legal, and political relationships.
5 More specifically with regard to Hinduism, equality for all  citizens,  as posited by the
Constitution, contradicts views of human nature that are found in many Hindu (upper
caste) traditions, which Coward (2005) summarizes as “presuppositions of karma and guṇa
theory.” As the author develops, “the very idea of ordering society in terms of sattvic
purity of guṇa theory is ruled out by the new Constitution. It is for this reason that D.E.
Smith describes the Constitution as introducing a revolution in traditional conceptions”
(Coward 2005:60).7 For Coward, the inspiration behind this “revolution” is to be traced
back to philosophers such as the Utilitarians (Bentham, Mill) and Locke: “in the Hindu
case the Constitution is acting to secularize and reform religion by replacing the karma
and guṇa presuppositions with the Lockean view of human nature” (Coward 2005:64).
Even if the “karma and guṇa theory” might not actually characterize all the traditions that
fall under the umbrella of “Hinduism,” it is certainly the case that the Constitutional
framework—its  fundamental  assumptions  about  the  individual  and  about  equality—
profoundly re-orientates the perspectives of many religions in India, and imposes a legal
universe of discourse which is at variance with widespread conceptions of the position of
man and other creatures within an overall divine order.
6 The  distinction  between  private  and  public  domains  has  had  other  important
consequences in matters of religion: the dissociation of religion, as a private belief and
activity, from religious institutions, many of which are deemed public in character, has
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allowed the State since British times to extend its control over these institutions in the
name of “rationalizing” their management.8 This is made clear in Article 25 (2) (a) of the
Constitution:
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent
the State from making any law—
(a)  Regulating  or  restricting  any  economic,  financial,  political  or  other  secular
activity  which  may  be  associated  with  religious  practice—my  emphasis)
(Constitution of India 1950:article 25(2)(a))
This formulation presupposes the possibility of distinguishing between the “secular” and
the “religious,” which the Constitution does not define however. It has historically fallen
on the Courts  to  establish,  case  by case,  the  activities  or  situations  that  were  to  be
considered  “secular”—on  which  they  could  pass  a  judgment—and  those  that  were
“religious”—outside  their  jurisdiction  (save  some  exceptions,  as  we  shall  see).  They
rapidly acknowledged that it could not be easily done. As Justice Gajendragadkar wrote in
1963 about Hinduism:
It is true that the decision regarding the question as to whether a certain practice is
a  religious  practice  or  not,  as  well  as  the  question  as  to  whether  an  affair  in
question is an affair in matters of religion or not, may present difficulties because
sometimes practices, religious and secular, are inextricably mixed up. This is more
particularly so in regard to Hindu religion because as is  well  known, under the
provisions of ancient Smritis, all human actions from birth to death and most of the
individual actions from day to day are regarded as religious in character. … Though
the task of disengaging the secular from the religious may not be easy,  it  must
nevertheless be attempted’ (Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji 1963:622).
Justice Gajendragadkar was a judge known for his reformist views who was brought up in
a family of pandits and was a Sanskrit scholar versed in Vedanta (Gadbois 2011:71). When
he was Chief Justice of India (1964–1966), he put forward in another judgment9 a rather
encompassing  view  of  Hinduism  mostly  based  on  the  philosophy  of  Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan (who was  President  of  India  at  the  time).10 While,  according  to  him,
establishing “the distinctive features of Hindu religion” was a near impossible task, he
nevertheless found that “monistic idealism … can be said to be the general distinguishing
feature of Hindu Philosophy” (a disputable contention) and that however diverse Hindu
philosophers and thinkers were, they all “accepted the Vedas as the sole foundation of
the Hindu philosophy” (Sastri Yagnapurushadji 1966:262). He added:
Whilst we are dealing with this broad and comprehensive aspect of Hindu religion,
it may be permissible to enquire what, according to this religion, is the ultimate
goal of humanity? It is the release and freedom from the unceasing cycle of births
and rebirths; Moksha or Nirvana, which is the ultimate aim of Hindu religion and
philosophy,  represents  the  state  of  absolute  absorption  and assimilation  of  the
individual soul with the infinite (Sastri Yagnapurushadji 1966:264)
As many studies have pointed out, this type of idealistic characterization of Hinduism has
been at the core of most judgments that have sought to distinguish the (truly) “religious”
from the “secular,” leading to a complete legal filtering of actual practices.
 
Winnowing out the chaff
7 The courts had to define the legal boundary between the religious and the secular
through successive rulings,  a boundary which became both clear-cut and yet  forever
shifting as the corresponding case law developed. This was done in various domains. By
way of an illustration, I shall sum up here the examples of litigations concerning priestly
services in temples.11
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8 As  a  result  of  administrative  changes  that  public  and  private  temple  management
committees  have  implemented  throughout  India,  the  role,  position,  rights,  and
appointment  of  priests  and other  temple  attendants  have regularly  come before  the
judges. For instance in a case concerning the hereditary succession to priestly office in
some temples in Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court held that:
the appointment of an Archaka [temple priest] is a secular act and the fact that in
some temples the hereditary principle was followed in making the appointment
would not make the successive appointments anything but secular. … That after his
appointment  the  Archaka  performs  worship  is  no  ground  for  holding  that  the
appointment  is  either  a  religious  Practice  or  a  matter  of  religion  (Seshammal 
1972:832).12
This position was confirmed in other judgments. The notion of “secular,” as far as priests
were  concerned,  was  also  expanded.  While  in  the  previous  judgment  it  was  the
appointment of a priest that was deemed to be secular, in a subsequent one the Supreme
Court held that it was the service of the priest as well as his person which were secular:
There is a distinction between religious service and the person who performs the
service; performance of the religious service … is an integral part of the religious
faith and belief …. But the service of the priest (archaka) is a secular part. … Though
performance of the ritual ceremonies is an integral part of the religion, the person
who performs it or associates himself with performance of ritual ceremonies, is not
(A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu 1996:118).13
As previously mentioned, this legal view of priesthood largely departs from former Hindu
conceptions of the person and especially from the religious qualifications required for
performing temple service. This led to a decision taken by the Supreme Court in 2002 that
opened priesthood in public temples (including Brahmanical ones) to all castes.14
9 The disentanglement of the religious and the secular which is thus undertaken by the
courts also makes use of a very powerful legal tool already present in other Common Law
systems, that of “essential practices.”15 It is worth noting that the notion has evolved
markedly in the Indian context and, from being applied to the secular domain, opened
the possibility of the courts’ intervention in the religious realm. For instance in 1954, in
the  so  called  Shirur  Mutt case,  already  mentioned,  Justice  Mukherjea  equated  non-
essential practices with “secular activity”:
[religion] should be taken in its strict etymological sense as distinguished from any
kind of secular activity which may be connected in some way with religion on but
does not form an essential part of it (The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments
1954:1018)
However, in 1961, another decision by Justice Gajendragadkar, who was an open advocate
of religious reform and for whom the notion of an essential practice applied not only to
secular practices but to religious ones, marked a turning point (Dhavan and Nariman
2000:260):
[I]t may not be out of place incidentally to strike a note of caution and Observe that
in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they
must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise
even purely  secular  practices  which are  not  an essential  or  an  integral  part  of
religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being
treated  as  religious  practices  within  the  meaning  of  Art. 26.  Similarly,  even
practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and
may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless
such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion
their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in
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other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an
essential and an integral part of it and no other.’ (The Durgah Committee 1961:412)
It is thus the task of the courts to ascertain what is “essential and integral” in a religion
according to its  own tenets,  and,  even if  religious,  what is  not essential  (and can be
interfered with). The courts’ appreciation has been wide-ranging, dealing with questions
such as the recipe for an offering, the rules for the consecration of temples, the identity
of  divine  representations,  animal sacrifice,  etc.  Although  different  judges  may  hold
different opinions, most of them in the upper courts tend to view religion from an idealist
perspective—much as Justice Gajendragadkar did. In this, the role of written texts, mostly
in Sanskrit and of a normative character, is of major importance: besides satisfying the
bent of mind of an elite milieu it meets a legal requirement, that of providing “proof,”
admissible  evidence.  Ascertaining  what  is  “essential”  to  a  religious  denomination
“according to its own tenets” therefore usually means scrutinizing its normative texts;16
and the absence of a textual reference for a religious practice or right, without being
invalidating, is clearly seen as an obstacle.17 A consequence of this predominantly textual
vision of religion has been to regard non-essential religious practices as “superstitions.”
As Bharati (1970) has shown, branding as a superstitious practice has a powerful political
and reformist  impact  in  the  Indian context.  In  fact,  the  legal  category  of  “essential
practice” has enabled courts to identify what (according to them) is “superstitious” in
Hinduism, “non-essential” and therefore amenable to the courts’ reformist action.
10 Indeed, the Constitution imposes on the State the duty of “providing for social welfare
and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to
all  classes and sections of  Hindus” (Constitution of  India 1950:Article 25 (2)(b)).  As a
consequence, religious freedom is subject to other fundamental rights: “No religious right
can, therefore,  be claimed in contravention of the other fundamental rights.”18 As N.
Bhagwati, Chief Justice of India from 1985 to 1986, stressed, “it was necessary to bring
about social reforms with a view to lifting India out of medievalism, obscurantism, blind
superstition and anti-social practices” (Bhagwati 2005:43). For this, “the secular State had
to perform this historic function of confining religion to its essential sphere,” and “the
Indian Constitution had, therefore, to accord to the state power to interfere with freedom
of religion” (Bhagwati 2005:43).19
11 Though this endeavor is rooted in a secularist agenda, it sometimes seems to converge
with the vision developed by Hindu reformist  movements  in the nineteenth century
(Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj), which projected an ideal of Vedic purity free of alleged later
“superstitions.” As Sen argued, 
though the impetus for the court’s rationalization and homogenization of religion
has its  origins  in a  liberal-democratic  conception of  secularism and the nation-
state,  as  exemplified  by  India’s  first  prime  minister,  Jawaharlal  Nehru,  and
philosopher-President  Sarvepalli  Radhakrishnan,  there  is  a  significant  overlap
between the judicial discourse and the ontology of Hindu nationalism (Sen 2007:6-7)
Indeed, the author points out that there is a possible shift between an inclusivist vision of
Hinduism exemplified by Swami Vivekananda or Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and expressed
in terms of an inbuilt tolerance of Hinduism, which appears—to some—to be similar to
secularism, toward a more radical and exclusivist vision promoted by Hindutva.20
 
Ruling on Rituals: Courts of Law and Religious Practices in Contemporary Hind...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 17 | 2018
6
Beyond policies: effects of a legal grid
Legal definitions and their impact
12 It is important to note that, beyond the personal opinions of individual judges or their
will to act as reformers in the name of progress, it is the very nature of the legal process
to categorize the world according to its own requirements. For instance, in their quest for
precision and “rationality,”  legal  scholars  and judges have endeavored to establish a
reference language that would be used by all the courts. As part of this process, there is a
need  to  provide  unambiguous  definitions  of  common-language  expressions  that
otherwise seem fuzzy or polysemic. It is one of the roles of the Courts to set down these
definitions  and  to  establish  the  legal  categories  on  which  judgments  may  be  based,
therefore  directly  impacting  the  issues  in  question—in  this  case,  religious  life.  This
intervention of the Courts is systemic in character. It does not necessarily stem from any
agenda other than the wish to eliminate semantic indeterminacy or confusion, as can be
seen in the fact that today’s courts may refer to British colonial precedents or to current
Common law in  other  countries,  and  that  the  definitions  they  articulate  may  apply
indiscriminately to Hinduism, Islam or Christianity. Here are a few examples concerning
Hinduism.
13 One  example  is  the  notion  of  “worshipper.”  Defining  who  is  to  be  considered  a
worshipper was found necessary with regard to the legal requirement of having locus
standi,  that is,  the need to have a personal interest in a given conflict in order to be
allowed to file a litigation (this requirement is eschewed in the much less common Public
Interest Litigation procedure). In order to accept a petition, a court has to determine if
the petitioner has an interest in the case; if not, the petition is rejected. What does it
mean to “have an interest” as far as religious matters are concerned? In the case of
temples in Tamil Nadu, for instance, Section 6 (15b) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious
and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, explains that it is “a person who is entitled to
attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the
temple, or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking in the benefit of the
distribution of gifts thereat” (quoted in Chockalingam 2010:§33). Thus, only worshippers at
a  given temple  may petition a  court  about  matters  regarding this  temple.  This  may
indeed sound restrictive. However the notion was given a wide berth by the Madras High
Court in 2010 on the basis of a law textbook:
Learned counsel for the first defendant … submitted that the plaintiffs are not the
worshippers  and  they  have  no  locus-standi  to  file  the  suit,  and  hence,  it  is
worthwhile to refer the book titled, “V.K. Varadachari’s Law of Hindu Religious and
Charitable  Endowments,”  Revised  by  Dr. R.  Prakash,  Advocate,  Supreme  Court,
Fourth Edition 2005, … which is relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs,
in  which,  it  is  noted  by  the  renowned  author  with  regard  to  the  meaning  of
“worshipper” in page 565, as follows: “The word worshipper does not mean only
those  persons  who  engage  themselves  in  some  sort  of  rituals  for  performing
worship. It has a wide meaning. Thus, a person merely visiting some temple and
after paying his respects goes away, is also a worshipper. A pujari, devotee, archaka,
sewak,  person  coming  to  have  darshan  and  pay  respect  are  all  included  in
“worshipper.” Even a single annual visit is sufficient to make one as worshipper of a
particular deity. A person may not have even gone to some temple, even then if he
is devoted to that particular one, he will be a worshipper (Chockalingam 2010:§31).
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As a consequence, such an apparently “technical” definition actually allows almost any
person recognized as Hindu and claiming to be a worshipper to have locus standi in a local
temple’s dispute, without having ever been to that temple—reinforcing the trend to see
Hinduism as  a  matter  of  individual  choice within  a  larger,  national  or  international
community of Hindus.
14 Other  notions  for  which  the  courts  sought  a  clear  definition  concern  “custom”  and
“usage” since it can be—and has been—argued that an infringement of an established
usage or custom is a violation of the freedom of religion as protected by the Constitution
when there are no contradicting textual  authorities and when it  does not go against
public order and morality.
15 “Custom” is usually held by the courts to mean “ancient or of remote antiquity or long
established, certain, invariable, uniform and continuous and reasonable and not open to
objection on the grounds of public policy or otherwise and not opposed to statute. The
custom to be valid must also be obligatory or compulsory in the sense that it must not be
in the option of any person whether he would conform to it or not” (Muniandi Kone and
Ors. 1981:§16)—this is a series of requirements that dates back to rulings by the Privy
Council in the 1870s. “Custom” and “usage” are more often than not mutually associated
in judgments according to standardized formulas such as “established custom and usage,”
“recognized custom and usage,” “ancient custom and usage.” However the courts have
sometimes felt the necessity to make a distinction:
“Usage” and “custom” are words of cognate expression, but nevertheless both have
some different  perceptions  and nuances.  The word “usage”  generally  denotes  a
habit or a mode of conduct or a course of action. … In Black’s Law Dictionary, the
word “usage” is described as different from custom as there is no usage through
inheritance though a right can be acquired by prescription. The following passage
is worthy of extraction here: “Usage in its most extensive meaning, includes both
custom and prescription,  but  in its  narrower significance,  it  refers  to a  general
habit, mode or course of procedure. A usage differs from a custom, in that it does
not require to be immemorial to establish the same, but the usage must be known,
certain, uniform, reasonable and not contrary to law” (N. Adithayan 1995:§9).
The  consequence  of  such  a  distinction  is  that  “usage”  has  sometimes  been  seen  as
imposing much fewer legal constraints in litigation than “custom,” since it was felt that
there was no need to establish its antiquity:
In  Venkataramaiya’s  Law  Lexicon  and  Legal  Maxims,  “usage”  is  defined  as  one
regularly and ordinarily practised by the inhabitants of the place. According to him
it is not necessary to require proof of its existence for any length of time in order to
establish “usage.” The word “usage” would include what the people are now or
recently in the habit of doing in a particular place. He would further state that this
particular habit may be only of a very recent origin or it may be one which has
existed for a long time (S. Mahendran 1991:§37).
In practice, the ambiguity maintained between “custom” and “usage” and the elasticity
given to the latter have enabled courts  to develop interpretations that  may seem to
deviate from the constitutional recognition of custom or usage as instances of “law,”
opposing for example usage or custom to established rights, or to rituals founded on a
textual authority, and holding that a custom is not inviolable and may need to change
with the times. Indeed, as Breckenridge (1977) or more recently Das Acevedo (2016) have
shown, courts themselves may establish and create a custom or a usage.
16 Not all definitions reached by the courts are so permissive. For instance, the Supreme
Court ruled in 1997 that a “religious ceremony” ends as soon as offerings are made; thus
Ruling on Rituals: Courts of Law and Religious Practices in Contemporary Hind...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 17 | 2018
8
the act of collecting offerings after this was not part of a religious duty; it was distinct and
secular in character (State Of Orissa And Sri Jagannath 1997). The understanding of what a
“religious  service”  is was  thus  considerably  restricted  compared  to  ordinary  and
widespread Hindu practices, conversely extending the scope of the “secular” domain that
is open to control by temple management.
17 There are many other instances of how imposing legal boundaries on religious categories
directly affects the way litigations may be decided. A “religious office” has been defined
in  the  same  contractual  terms  as  any  commercial  or  administrative  office,  thereby
injecting  into  the  religious  domain  legal  concepts  defined  for  other  contexts  and
purposes:
It is clear that, to constitute an office one, if not the essential, thing is the existence
of a duty or duties attached to the office which the office-holder is under a legal
obligation  to  perform  and  the  nonperformance  of  which  may  be  visited  by
penalties, such as a suspension, dismissal, etc (Vathiar Venkatachariar 1918).
This definition was relied upon in a Supreme Court judgment in 1961 regarding whether a
South Indian religious pontiff had an “office” in this legal sense in a particular temple,
where he claimed precedence for receiving customary honors. The Court also ruled that
these honors were not part of any office (in this legal sense) and could not therefore be
considered as legal rights: in order for honors to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts,
they need to be “an integral  part  of  the ritual  to be performed” and “a part  of  the
remuneration to the office”—my emphasis) (Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer And Others 1961). What
is paradoxical is that in deciding courts had no jurisdiction over these religious honors,
the Supreme Court actually developed at length notions at the core of temple life with an
immediate effect on the relationships between temple devotees and the authorities. What
is a religious office? It is a contractual service that can be subjected to penalties. What is a
religious honor? The Supreme Court supported an idea formulated by J. Sadasiva Aiyar in
1913 according to which it is a divine favor that one should be ashamed to claim as a
“right.”(Athan Sadagopachariar Swamigal 1913) As a consequence, litigations concerning
honors that were not part of the “remuneration of an office” could not be accepted by
civil courts: by disclaiming any jurisdiction on such matters and apparently protecting
the  freedom  of  religion,  the  Supreme  Court  actually  enforced  a  very  restricted
understanding  of  “religious  honors”  with  far-reaching  consequences  for  religious
practices and claims.
 
A question of jurisdiction
18 However, there are situations recognized by the courts as religious ones but over which
they nevertheless have jurisdiction. This is made possible by considering that conflicts
involving certain religious  issues  pertain to  questions  of  civil  rights,  which are to  be
decided by civil courts of law.
19 For instance, the right to religious office is “in the nature of property under the Hindu
Law” (Raj Kali Kuer 1955:189),21 a good example of how a legal concept from a different
context  (here  property  laws)  is  extended to  religion;  therefore  civil  courts  have  full
jurisdiction to decide on this matter. The Code of Civil Procedure (Section 9, Explanation
I) is very explicit about this and adds that “a suit in which the right to property or to an
office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend
entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies”—my emphasis)
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20 Similarly, the right to worship in a specific place (e.g. a temple) has been treated as a
“right to access land and water,” and is protected under Sections 145 and 147 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. These sections enable an Executive Magistrate to act whenever
a  dispute  concerning  such  a  right  is  “likely to  cause  a  breach  of  peace.”  Since  the
expression “land and water” is said to cover “buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other
produce of land, and the rents of any such property,” it also applies to temples, and more
largely to places of worship. By extension, it actually protects the right to worship (in a
particular place):
The dispute as to worship, however, may be a dispute as to the worship of a deity in
a particular temple or place. It appears to me that if such be the dispute then the
dispute as to the worship necessarily involves a dispute as to the user of the land or
building in which the particular deity is located. … To deny the right of worship in a
particular place is to deny the right to use that place in a particular manner. The
right to worship as I have said cannot be regarded as something entirely apart from
the place of worship … it must be held that a dispute as to the right to worship a
deity in a particular temple is a Dispute falling within the ambit of Section 147, Cr.
P. C. (Dhirendra Nath Das 1951:§38).
Madras High Court already held that the right of an individual to worship in a temple can
be assimilated to the general category of “right to access land”:
It may be that the dispute in actual fact may have more to do with what a man does
in the temple after entering into it and not so much with his actual entry into the
temple; nevertheless where the right regarding which a dispute exists is one which
is  inseparably  connected  with  the  right  to  enter  a  building  and  cannot  be
dissociated from it the dispute cannot be said to be not one regarding an alleged
right of user of the building (Velappa Goundan And Ors. 1938, quoted in Chinnubhai
Chandulal Parikh 1971:§5)
Indeed, the right to worship is so firmly established that courts do not necessarily refer to
a right to “access to land and water” in this respect, and consider it to be simply a civil
right in itself—it has been affirmed that “the right to an act of worship stands on the
same footing as a right to an office; a person is entitled to enforce it by suit in the same
way” (Thirumalai Alwar Aiyangar 1916:§18).
21 A conflict among Jains provides an illustration of the kind of decision on rituals that
courts take in order to protect the right to worship.  In Ugamsingh & Mishrimal (1970)
decided by the Supreme Court, Digambaras were opposed to Svetambaras putting false
eyes (chaksus) on an idol of the first Tirthankara (Rishabhanatha / Adinatha) in a temple
at Paroli (Rajasthan) that both sects shared, and adding a flag mast (dvajadand) and a
crowning kalash to the temple. Neither these additions to the temple nor the attributes
added to the idol were acceptable to the Digambaras—e.g. they could only worship an idol
of a Tirthankara if it were left naked.
22 The Digambaras complained that the Svetambaras “attempted to convert the said idol
into the idol of Swetambara Sect by putting Chakshus (artificial eyes) thereon, but were
prevented from doing so by a strong opposition of the followers of the Digamber Sect”;
that they (the Svetambaras) planned “to put Dhwajadand and Kalash on the said Temple
according to their tenets”; and that they intended “to enclose the said idol by putting up
doors and locks with the object of interfering with and obstructing the free exercise by
the Digamberies of their unfettered rights to perform Poojan, Prakshal and worship of the
said idol according to their tenets.” (Ugamsingh & Mishrimal 1970:§3).
23 As for the Swetambaras, they objected in the course of various arguments that “the Civil
court had no jurisdiction to decide the religious rights of the parties nor is it a dispute of
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the  civil  nature”  (Ugamsingh  &  Mishrimal 1970:§4).  However,  the  Supreme  Court
considered  that  the  moves  contemplated  by  the  Swetambaras “could  preclude  the
Digamberies from worshipping in accordance with their tenets” (Ugamsingh & Mishrimal
1970:§15):
It is admitted that the Digamberies will not worship the idol which is not “Nirakar”
[“shapeless”] or which has Chakshus. If the Digamberies have a right to worship at
the temple the attempt of the Swetamberies to put Chakshus to place Dhwajadand
or Kalash in accordance with their tenets and to claim that the idol is a Swetamberi
idol was to preclude the Digamberies from exercising their right to worship at the
temple.  These  findings  clearly  establish  that  the  Appellants  interfered with  the
rights of Digamberies to worship with respect to which a civil suit is maintainable
under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Ugamsingh & Mishrimal 1970:§15)
After establishing that the Digambaras had a traditional right to worship in the temple,
the Court therefore ruled that putting chakshus and making other additions to the idol
and to the temple would prevent Digambaras from worshipping:  therefore their civil
“right to worship” was threatened, and the courts had full jurisdiction to intervene—in
that case, by forbidding the Svetambaras from making their contested additions. Though
the basic principle according to which the courts will not endeavor to lay down a ritual
which is to be followed in the worship is constantly reiterated, the consequence of the
courts’ jurisdiction over rights to worship or access a religious office—which are civil
rights—has therefore actually led to many interventions in ritual  matters,  which has
indeed been made plain:
Disputes pertaining to religious office including performance of rituals were always
decided by the Courts established by law. There are numerous authorities where
dispute about entry in the Temple,  right to worship,  performing certain rituals,
have  been taken cognizance  of  and decided by  civil  Courts.  The  Court  protects
persons in the enjoyment of a certain status or property and it may incidentally
become the duty of the Civil Court to determine what are the accepted tenets of the
followers of a creed and what is the usage they have accepted as established for the
regulation of their rights inter-se’ (Chockalingam 2010:§34—my emphasis).22
 
Striking a balance between the right to worship and ways of
worshipping
24 Courts protect the right to worship as a civil right and the freedom to do so according to
one’s own belief; however, such worship should not affect the right of other persons and
has to be bona fide. Two brief examples illustrate the impact the courts’ assessment of this
condition may have.
25 The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rattan Singh and ors. (1951) had to deal with a
conflict  between  bareheaded  devotees  and  covered-headed  ones  in  a  mandir  which
Lahore High Court had previously (1936) declared not to be a Sikh Gurdwara. Bareheaded
devotees complained they were prevented by the covered-headed ones from entering the
mandir  and  worshipping  there.  The  High  Court,  quoting  precedents,  underlined  the
general principle according to which the right to worship a deity according to one’s own
belief is of a civil nature. The judge decided in favor of the plaintiffs because, according to
him, coming bareheaded could not be seen as affecting others’ right to worship: “whether
a man goes bare-headed or otherwise is not a form of ritual and even if he goes into the
temple  and begins  to  worship without  anything on his  head it  may be good or  bad
manners according to the notions of the people but this has no reference to the ritual” (
Rattan Singh and ors. 1951:§5).
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26 This power of the courts does not concern Hinduism alone—which reinforces the idea
that this form of legal action in religious matters is beyond any particularities regarding
policies or persons. For instance, Allahabad High Court ruled in Syed Farzand Ali (1980)
that Muslims of the Ahl-i-Hadith tradition had the right to speak the word “Amen” aloud
in  response  to  the  prayer  leader  in  mosques  of  the  Mathura  district  without  being
hindered by Muslims of the Hanafi tradition who tried to oppose this practice. This was a
long-standing conflict and judgments to decide the same question already existed by the
end of the nineteenth century (Queen Empress 1885; Ataullah 1890). These earlier rulings
were  confirmed  by  the  Allahabad  High  Court,  with  particular  reference  to  Justice
Mahmood in Ataullah:
As  to  the  question  of  pronouncing  the  word  “Aameen”  I  hold  that  the  word
“Aameen” must be said at the end of the prayer ending with Sure-i-Fateha. I hold
also that this should be pronounced. I hold also that there is a difference of the
exact note in which it should be pronounced and I hold that there is no authority to
say at what note of the vocal octave the voice should emanate. There are some who
think that the speaking of the word “Aameen” aloud is required by devotion and
feeling  and  is  necessary  for  their  prayers.  I  hold,  therefore,  that  there  is  no
authority in the Mohammadan Ecclesiastical Law to limit the tone of voice in which
the word “Aameen” is to be pronounced; that so long as the plaintiffs appellants are
Muhammadans, as we have found they are, so long they are entitled to enter the
mosque and perform the worship and say the word “Aameen” without anything to
restrain their tone or note of the octave. But if the pronouncement of the word
“Aameen” results in the disturbance of peace, that of course will have to be dealt
with under the Criminal Law. (quoted in Syed Farzand Ali 1980:§5)
Indeed, the margin between legitimately deciding on religious issues (when civil rights
are deemed to be at stake) and unduly interfering in religious matters is rather narrow.
As was stressed in Gopanna, “it may not always be easy to draw the line between what is
merely a part of the ritual of worship and what is a right to conduct the worship itself” (J.
Gopanna 1944). The above judgment in Syed Farzand Ali (1980) was thus commented upon
and implicitly disagreed with in another case, this time concerning Christians (Koil Pillai): 
a careful reading of the decision would indicate that it is only an authority for the
proposition that Mussalman is entitled to enter a mosque which is dedicated to God
and is also entitled to join in the prayers and utter the word “Aameen” loudly but
not with the aim or mala fide intention to disturb the peace of the congregation.
Besides the single Judge of the Allahabad High Court who rendered the decision has
not given any reason for holding that the utterance of the word “Aameen” is not a
ritual or a form of prayer but a civil right (Koil Pillai 1992:§8).23
In this  case the judge instead stressed the line of  argument previously developed in
M. Appadorai Aiyangar to strike a balance between the two contradictory requirements
made of the courts: not to interfere in religious matters while protecting civil rights,
which may lead to such interference.
It has been recognised that the Court in adjudicating on a right of worship or a
right  to a  religious  office  not  infrequently  is  obliged  to  decide  incidentally
questions of ritual but it follows that the Court will not on a mere pretence that a
right to worship has been infringed, arrogate to itself a jurisdiction which it does
not  possess  to  prescribe  forms  of  prayer,  rights  to  religious  precedence  and
questions of that nature. (M. Appadorai Aiyangar 1938:§11)
 
Final remarks
27 Discussing secularism in India is usually done by analyzing the Constitutional provisions
and the acts of judges in their implementation. As the first part of this paper recalls,
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extended scholarship has underlined the growth and the importance of legal categories
such as “secular,” “essential practices,” “superstition,” in shaping Hinduism today. The
reformist agenda promoted by some judges in accordance with an interpretation of the
Constitution that gives precedence to fundamental rights over the protection of religious
freedom has further widened the scope of the law’s intervention. However, important
changes in religion are also brought forth through action of a less political nature on the
part of the courts. Such processes result from systemic properties of Common law and are
quite  independent  from  any  secularist  agenda.  One  of  them,  already  identified  by
scholars, is the general effect produced by the fact that the Constitution is centered on
individuals on the basis of equality, a legal framework at odds with widely shared Hindu
conceptions and practices. The second part of this paper has tried to explore two other
characteristics of the legal system that may similarly have a quasi-mechanical impact on
religion (not only Hinduism but others as well): the fact that ordinary words are given a
legal,  technical  definition  that  is  sometimes  quite  different  from  their  usual
understanding in the religious realm (for instance “religious service,” “religious office,”
“religious honor”); and the fact that the protection of a civil right such as the “right to
worship”  imposes  on  the  court  the  duty  to  rule  on  related  religious  issues,  even
“essential” ones.
28 As a matter of fact, many of these legal definitions and the whole reasoning behind the
discussion on jurisdiction make use of notions that were originally developed for other
purposes. A right to an office is taken as an instance of a more general right to property.
The right to a religious office does not differ from the right to any other office, which
means that it must satisfy the same conditions to be held valid. The right to worship is
taken as just one instance of the right to access or use land and water, which is regulated
by dispositions of the Criminal Code.
29 This suggests a much deeper-rooted entanglement of law and religion than is usually
assumed. At one level it certainly can be approached in terms of heritage, or enforcement
of secularism, or religious reform, or a judge’s personal agenda. But at a much more
fundamental  level  it  also  results  from the  legal  system itself  which  imposes  a  legal
categorization on aspects of religious life: religion has to fall within this legal universe of
discourse and of enforceable rules. The kind of religion that is thus eventually shaped is
mostly  framed by  questions  and  rules  that  were  initially  elaborated  for  other,  non-
religious litigations. Indeed, nearly all aspects of religious life may thus be re-defined
through such legal  categories projected and imposed on religious issues,  a fact often
underestimated  in  the  description  of  actual  attitudes,  practices,  and  institutions  in
religion.
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NOTES
1. See  also  Kirsch and Turner  (2009).  As  Agrama (2010)  argues, the  discourse  on secularism
constantly blurs the distinction it claims to establish between a religious domain and a secular
one, and the management of this indeterminacy is at the very root of the state’s power as a
“secular” political entity.
2. For a discussion, see Baxi (2007).
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3. For  a  broader  study of  the  role  of  the  State  and of  Courts  of  law in  the  management  of
Hinduism in  India,  see  Berti,  Tarabout  and Voix  (2016),  which  is  an  outcome of  the  Project
“Justice and Governance in Contemporary India and South Asia” (“Just-India,”  see www.just-
india.net),  2009–2012,  funded  by  the  French  “Agence  Nationale  de  la  Recherche”  (program
ANR-08-GOUV-064).  The  materials  and  ideas  set  forth  in  the  present  paper  benefited  from
discussions during a Yale seminar in 2015 and a Yale workshop (“Entanglements of Law and
Religion in South Asia,” April 28–29, 2017, organized by the South Asian Studies Council at the
Yale MacMillan Center). I wish to thank the discussants and the participants for their remarks. I
am also grateful to the two anonymous SAMAJ reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
4. I have relied on the reading of more than 200 relevant judgments found on the internet; only a
few are referenced here (their full reference is provided at the end of the paper). There might be
the feeling that there is an over-representation of judgments coming from South India, which
might be due both to historical  factors  (the early development of  temple regulations by the
colonial  state in the former Madras Presidency) and to personal idiosyncrasies (Kerala is  my
privileged area of study). All the judgments studied come from the upper courts: this does not
mean that subordinate or District and Sessions judges do not deal with religious issues (they do,
as  traces  of  their  decisions  may  be  found  in  appeal  documents),  only  that  upper  courts’
judgments are the basis of case law, as well as being more easily available.
5. However De cautions us “against reading the dramatic growth of individual rights claims as a
growth in individual rights consciousness” (De 2013:51)
6. As Dhavan comments, the lack of a precise definition of these terms is such that “almost any
part of religious activity is subject to control” (Dhavan 1987:230)
7. The reference to D.E. Smith concerns one of his books that was published in 1963, India as a
Secular State.
8. See Mudaliar (1974) and Presler (1987) for comprehensive studies of this process in the Madras
Presidency. Public endowments, which the state has the duty to regulate, are distinguished from
private endowments, which have wide autonomy; however the boundary between the two is not
always  situated  in  the  same  place  by  the  courts  or  by  the  legislature  (Baltutis 2005).  Many
scholars  have  pointed  out  that  there  has  been  an  increase  in  State  control  over  religious
endowments since 1950—Dhavan even suggests that “What is happening is not the temporary
intervention of regulatory control by the state. Religious endowments are being nationalized on
an extensive scale” (Dhavan 2001:315).
9. Sastri Yagnapurushadji 1966. The case concerned the Swaminarayanan sect claiming in appeal
to the Supreme Court to be a distinct religion from Hinduism (the appeal was dismissed).
10. Baird (2005) has pointed out that this important judgment blurs the distinction made in the
Constitution between Hinduism as a religious category and Hinduism as a legal category.
11. For a detailed case study see Tarabout (2016).
12. Seshammal 1972. For a discussion of this important case, see Fuller (1991, 2003), Presler (1987),
Reiniche (1989). British rulings were already quite similar; see for instance K. Seshadri Aiyangar
1911.
13. Similarly, the preparation of food offerings was declared to be a religious process, but the
conduct of the person engaged in their preparation could not be said to be religious in any way.
Kodakkattu Cheriya Krishnan Namboothiri 2008.
14. N. Adithayan 2002. For a more detailed treatment of this question, see Tarabout 2016. The
question is still topical: see more recently Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal 2015; among various critical
comments on this latter case, see Yamunan 2015.
15. For a detailed critique, see Dhavan and Nariman (2000:259–61).
16. For  example,  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  so-called  “tandava  dance”  was  an
essential part of Ananda Marga’s tenets was discussed in court in terms of (the absence / writing
up  of)  textual  reference—see  Voix  2016.  On  the  role  of  pandits  self-assumed  by  judges
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interpreting  Sanskrit  texts,  and  acting  therefore  as  religious  authorities,  see  for  instance
Rudolph and Rudolph (1965), Galanter (1971), Dhavan (1987), Fuller (1988), Lariviere (1988).
17. However  ritual  normative  texts  may  sometimes  be  balanced  with  “established  usage”—
Chockalingam 2010.
18. N. Adithayan 1995:§ 16.
19. “The wide powers granted to the state in pursuit of the reform of Hindu social practices
sharply contrasted with the concern not to be seen as interfering with the religious practices of
Muslims or Christians. By associating the Indian state with the reform of the social practices of
people belonging to a particular religious tradition, it placed the state in a unique position in
relation to that tradition.” (Chiriyankandath 1999)
20. The  supposedly  specific  “tolerance”  of  Hinduism  and  the  political  consequences  of  this
assumption have been critically discussed at length. See for instance Halbfass (1988, a comment
on Paul Hacker’s concept of “Inklusivismus”), Hatcher (1994), Mallampalli (1995), Sen (2010:6-7).
21. This judgments quotes numerous precedents from the 1930s onward. As early as the 1870s, in
Mitta  Kunth  Audhicarry 1874  it  was  ruled  that  hereditary  priestly  office  in  a  family  was  a
“property” subject to partition between joint owners.
22. This is actually a quote from an 1879 judgment: “It is certainly not the duty of the Civil Court
to  pronounce  on  the  truth  of  religious  tenets  nor  to  regulate  religious  ceremony;  but,  in
protecting persons in the enjoyment of a certain status or property, it may incidentally become
the duty of the Civil Court to determine what are the accepted tenets of the followers of a creed
and what is the usage they have accepted as established for the regulation of their rights inter-se”
(Krishname & Ors. 1879), also quoted in Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan 1995. The latter judgment
concludes “it is clear that a suit filed after coming into force of the Constitution for vindication of
rights related to worship of status, office or property is maintainable in civil court and it would
be [the]  duty  of  the  court  to  decide  even purely  religious  questions  if  they have a  material
bearing on the right alleged in the plaint regarding worship, status or office or property.”
23. This observation was rather a simplification of Syed Farzand Ali (1980) as the judge in the
latter case relied on Ataullah (1890) in which detailed argumentation is provided.
ABSTRACTS
The Indian Constitution posits a separation between a secular domain regulated by the State, and
a religious domain in which it must not interfere. However, courts of law are regularly called
upon to resolve a multiplicity of issues related to religion, and their decisions may have a far-
reaching  impact  on  religious  conceptions  and  practices.  The  judicial  process  requires  that
standardized, clear-cut definitions of many notions (such as “religion” itself, or “worshipper,”
“custom,” “usage,” “religious service,” “religious office,” “religious honor,” etc.) be established
in order for them to be manageable within a legal context. Moreover, even though a religious
domain may be distinguished from a secular one and protected from State intervention, there
are litigations concerning civil  rights that  involve religious issues on which civil  courts  may
therefore  have  an  explicit  duty  to rule.  Interventions  such  as  imposing  legal  definitions  or
deciding on religious matters on which civil rights depend are systemic in character and intrinsic
to “modern” law itself. In this they do differ from any explicit policy of state secularism or the no
less explicit reformist will of some judges, which may change according to the historical period
or to their personal dispositions. This paper comments on several judgments from the upper
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courts of India chosen from the end of the nineteenth century to the present day, with a view to
discussing  the  disputed  limits  of  this  judicial  intervention  and  the  resulting  entanglement
between law and religion.
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Keywords: Hinduism, secularism, courts of law, essential practices, religious office, right to
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